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Abstract
Piracy in Somalia is a phenomenon that has presented several challenges for the international 
community since the beginning of the 21st century. Effectively formulating a plan of action against 
piracy requires the willingness of the international community to work together by implementing 
strong multilateral operations between countries and understanding the social and economic 
difficulties faced by Somalia, which has given rise to the endemic and its expansion throughout 
the region. Eradicating piracy means tackling the issue on land by confronting Somalia’s extreme 
poverty and lack of economic opportunity as well as creating a comprehensive legal framework 
that will serve as a model to fight piracy. The objective of the present paper is to discuss the roots 
of piracy in Somalia and the cycle it created, as well as provide an analysis on the legal framework 
in place in order to judge its effectiveness on an international level. The method applied to lead 
this research is based on the analysis of reports from international bodies such as the UN and 
the ICC, as well as academic articles. The results have shown that piracy is the fruit of social, 
economic, and political issues that have enabled the phenomenon to spread and establish itself 
in the country. 
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Introduction 
Maritime piracy has become a worrying 
issue, particularly in the pirate-infested region 
of the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia, 
which poses great security threats to the 
thousands of ships sailing this route every 
day. The region holds strategic and economic 
importance due to the high maritime traffic. 
Every day, ships are exposing themselves to 
the increased risk of pirate attacks, endangering 
both the crews and the merchandise onboard. 
Several attacks were led off Somalia’s coast, 
triggering international concern over safety. 
A well-known attack in March 2011 targeted 
the MV Sinar Kudus, which was the first 
Indonesian ship hijacked by Somali pirates. 
The ship and the crew were held captive for 46 
days before being released after a ransom of $ 
4.5 million was paid (Ismunadi, 2011).
Somalia has attracted the attention of 
the international community after continuous 
pirate attacks in the region, triggering the main 
question on how to effectively deal with this 
issue. Somalia has a long history of conflict and 
unrest, which contributed to the ongoing chaos 
in the country and led to the development of 
piracy on its shores. The difficulty of finding an 
adequate long-term solution to fighting piracy 
has been the main problem the international 
community currently faces. 
This paper aims to answer the following 
questions: what are the root causes of piracy in 
Somalia, and what are the solutions provided 
both onshore and off? Piracy is a crime 
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taking its roots on land. It requires long-term 
solutions focusing on the creation of an honest, 
effective, and determined justice system and the 
commitment of the international community to 
eradicate this issue entirely (Murphy, 2008).
Literature Review
According to Murphy, piracy can be 
defined as a land-based crime. The solution to 
effectively fight piracy is to create honest and 
determined criminal justice system (Murphy, 
2008). Treves (2009) also supports the idea 
that piracy has become a lucrative business in 
Somalia due to the political instability caused 
by the absence of an effective government as 
well as fighting between different factions for 
power. Furthermore, the author points out the 
inadequacy of the present legal framework 
on piracy to fight violent activities off Somali 
coasts. This inadequacy lies in the narrow 
definition of piracy according to international 
law and the willingness of seizing states 
to exercise their jurisdiction and prosecute 
pirates. International law allows actions to be 
taken against pirates, but it does not ensure 
that those actions are adequately taken. In 
“Securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia,” 
author Bilyana Tsvetkova argues that Somali 
piracy has become a regional and security 
issue due to its impact on international trade 
and human security. For this reason, the 
international community was enticed to 
become more proactive in the repression of 
piracy and to formulate solutions against this 
problem (Tsvetkova, 2009). Tsvetkova agrees 
with Murphy’s claim that eradicating Somali 
piracy requires measures to interrupt the 
system supporting it inland (Tsevtkova, 2009). 
In his research on the political discourse and the 
policy response of the international community, 
Rothe and Collins (2011) concluded that the 
policies currently in place to deter piracy were 
largely inefficient. They ignored the root causes 
of piracy, such as the disorganized Somali 
society and the lack of a central authority. 
The policies rather support global interests 
and state/corporate self-interests (Rothe & 
Collins, 2011). The general consensus among 
academics is the international community’s 
lack of interest and the inadequate policies in 
place to respond to the threat. The international 
community still remains wary of carrying 
out activities, especially onshore, to eradicate 
piracy successfully, preferring offshore military 
action instead. This weariness is due to the lack 
of a credible national government with whom 
to partner up (Affi, Elmi, & Mohammed, 2015). 
By preferring to take actions offshore to secure 
international trade routes, the international 
community highlights its priority to protect 
foremost international trade before dealing with 
the root causes of piracy onshore (Martinez-
Zarzoso & Bensassi, 2012). The UN, the EU, the 
US, as well as other developed countries whose 
economy is supported on maritime commerce 
have suggested that the best approach to 
maritime piracy is through military means 
by the deployment of multinational naval 
warships that would restore security at sea. 
The weight of these international actors on 
the approach to piracy have overshadowed 
other anti-piracy approaches. For instance, the 
African Union has suggested re-establishing 
functioning governments (Tsabora, 2011).  
Background:  Somalian Civil War
The nature of the Somali conflict and the 
international context in which it has occurred 
since the 1980s has been constantly evolving. 
In its first phase, the conflict that started first 
as a civil war in the late 80s slowly turned into 
conflicts between war lords in the 1990s before 
becoming a conflict of ideology with the rise of 
radical Islam in the 21st century (Bradbury & 
Healy, 2010). The consequence of this conflict’s 
evolution led to the disintegration of the Somali 
state and its inability to unite its government 
into a centralized authority later on. The state 
of lawlessness that befell Somalia in 1991 and 
the failure of the international community to 
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rebuild and stabilize the country will enable 
piracy to develop and grow as a consequence. 
Somalia as a Failed State
Menkhaus suggests that the categorization 
of Somalia as a failed state can be dated back 
from the 1970s following the Ogaden war with 
Ethiopia in 1977. The first signs of state failure 
were the collapse of Somalia’s education system 
and state farm production in the 1970s. It was 
then followed by the weakening and dysfunction 
of most government institutions, rising tensions 
between clans, low salaries, and high levels of 
corruption, all of which consequently led to the 
expropriation of resources, especially foreign aid, 
for personal gains (Menkhaus, 2010).
The collapse of Somalia is linked to 
external and internal factors. Externally, 
Somalia’s disintegration is the legacies of 
European colonization and the Cold War. 
Consequently,  Somali  society became 
increasingly militarized and divided (Loubser 
& Solomon, 2014). The wars that followed 
with neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, 
greatly weakened the country (Bradbury & 
Healy, 2010). Internally, the conception of a 
centralized government holding authority 
created tensions within Somali culture based 
on a kinship system in which power is shared 
(Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2008). 
From 1969 to 1991, Somalia was under 
the harsh regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. 
Barre’s dictatorship led to growing resentment 
amongst the population and cultivated rivalries 
between clans.  The repercussions of Barre’s 
politics have contributed to the inability of 
Somali clans to form a unified government 
(Menkhaus, 2007). 
The fall of Barre’s regime was accelerated 
by the end of Cold War and the decline of 
Somalia’s strategic importance, which then 
lead to the diminution of foreign aid. For 
over 15 years, foreign aid had sustained the 
extensive patronage system and civil service 
to stabilize the regime (Menkhaus, 2007). By 
January 1991, the insufficient resources and 
the discontentment toward the government 
caused Barre’s removal from power. Somalia 
was the theater of violent clashes for power 
and control between clans. Warlords began 
taking control of Somalia’s fractured territory 
and competed against each other to extend their 
domination (Bradbury & Healy, 2010, p.10). 
Somalia formally reached its collapse by May 
1991 (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). 
International response to Somalia’s collapse
In response to Somalia’s collapse, the 
United States, with the support of the United 
Nations, launched a multinational force 
in December 1992 called “United Nations 
Operation in Somalia” (UNOSOM) in the hopes 
of restoring order and responding to security 
challenges posed by the collapsed Somali 
state through military and humanitarian 
intervention (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). From 
1992 to 1995, UNOSOM aimed to revive 
important governmental functions and restart 
the economy to increase security. Humanitarian 
operations, which consisted of food and water 
distribution, were also actively conducted. 
However, UNOSOM was highly criticized for 
its failure to end conflicts and disarm factions 
that hindered the peace process. UNOSOM 
instead contributed to conflicts in Somalia by 
reinforcing the warlord power structures and 
allowing the proliferation of armed groups. As 
a result , UNSOM was forced to withdraw its 
forces. This event marked the disengagement of 
Western powers (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). On a 
regional level, after the retreat of UNOSOM, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) became involved as the main actor 
to resolve the Somali conflict by promoting 
political dialogue and restoring stability. 
However, IGAD faced many obstacles in the 
pursuit of its mandate such as the lack of 
political will from Somali clan elders who were 
reluctant to share power, financial constraints, 
weak armies, and the lack of logistical support 
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to continue its operations (Hearn et al., 2014). 
Shortly after, IGAD was replaced by the African 
Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 
and is currently operating in the country. 
AMISOM focuses on state-building and peace-
building operations. Its main objective is to 
establish security by increasing the territorial 
control of the Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS). Its serves as a force to impose the 
legitimacy of the FGS and thus solve the issue 
of state failure plaguing the country since 1991 
(Williams et al., 2018). The mission has also 
been actively engaged in military operations 
aimed at dismantling terrorist groups (Williams 
et al., 2018). Although the terrorist threat is 
still present, AMISOM was able to increase 
security, which has allowed Somalia to engage 
in the political process for reconciliation and 
transfer some security responsibilities to Somali 
forces, thus reviving important components of 
a well-functioning nation. However, just like 
IGAD, AMISOM still faces many obstacles 
in conducting its operations, such as the lack 
of resources and capabilities to successfully 
accomplish its mandate (Williams et al., 2018). 
Its planned withdrawal in 2021 threatens 
stability and territorial gains (Faleg, 2019). 
During the years following the collapse of 
Barre’s regime, the US became heavily involved 
in Somalia through UNITAF and Operation 
Restore Hope, which was set to help the 
humanitarian catastrophe faced by the Somali 
people with the help of military force. The result 
was remarkably successful. UNITAF secured 
ports and airfields, helped humanitarian 
organizations safely reach their destination, 
and they opened up communication lines. 
Unfortunately, the support provided by 
UNITAF was subjected to conflicts between 
the military and the humanitarian community 
(Kennedy, 1996). This issue appears again 
with the establishment of UNSOM in 2017 
and the opposition of humanitarian groups, 
which feared the politicization of humanitarian 
activities (Action Against Hunger, 2015). 
Civil society organizations (CSO) have 
also played the important role of filling 
in the gaps left by the collapse of Barre’s 
regime. These non-state actors participated 
in efforts of peace-building by promoting 
dialogue, reconciliation, and rebuilding trust 
in a polarized society. CSOs were facing many 
difficulties in implementing themselves as 
a unifying force due to institutional issues, 
lack of resources, organizational weaknesses, 
and internal disputes (Osman, 2018). Another 
major issue is the lack of non-partisan CSOs. 
Associations and NGOs often followed 
clan lines, which is not surprising given 
the context of Somalia’s society based on 
kinship (Tiilikainen & Mohamed, 2012). Many 
criticisms were formulated against the local 
and international NGOs that have been using 
war for their own benefits. The success of these 
different initiatives, although not negligible, 
are limited due to financial issues to conduct 
and maintain operations, identity politics that 
hinder the unification of the Somali people and 
the establishment of government legitimacy, as 
well as the issue of extremism relating to the 
influence of terrorist groups. 
The Rise of Islamist Movements
The failure of the international community 
to find a suitable solution to the Somali 
problem provided a fertile ground for the 
emergence of Islamist extremists seeking 
to create an Islamic State. Since 1991, local 
terrorist organizations, such as Al-Itihaad, have 
actively tried to establish an Islamic State in 
Somalia by developing indirect political control 
through the infiltration of local administrations 
(International Crisis Group, 2002). Al Qaeda 
has also developed its network in Somalia 
by supporting local Islamic groups with 
training and logistics. The unguarded coasts of 
Somalia have sparked concern among Western 
countries, which believed that Al Qaeda was 
using Somalia as one of the group’s hidden 
bases for its land and maritime operations. 
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A n o t h e r  c o n c e r n  r a i s e d  b y  t h e 
international community was the possibility 
of collusion between terrorists and pirates 
in the region (Nelson, 2012). This concern 
is mainly motivated by the assumption that 
terrorists could be inspired by the pirates to 
conduct maritime operations against ships 
(Murphy, 2008) or use piracy as a means 
to finance their land operations (Brookes, 
2009). However, today, there is no conclusive 
evidence supporting this claim (Murphy, 
2008). 
Nevertheless, the lack of an effective 
government in Somalia provides ground for 
criminal activities to take place. The historical 
roots of the Somali conflicts have given rise 
to the phenomenon of piracy by creating an 
adequate setting for such activity to develop 
over time. Piracy in Somalia has thrived on 
two decades of extreme violence, which have 
had devastating economic, political, and social 
effects on the population and nation at large. 
Failed State and the Rise of Piracy
In this context, Somalia’s failure to form 
a stable government since 1991 led to the 
development of piracy as a response to the 
absence of a central authority able to control 
the territory and provide basic needs to the 
population. One of the main consequences of a 
state’s disintegration is the inability to perform 
security tasks. This meant that Somalia’s 
3,330km coastline, the longest in continental 
Africa, as well as its borders were not patrolled 
(Tharoor, 2009). Therefore, foreign fishing ships 
were able to take advantage of the political 
situation. The absence of an effective authority 
over Somali territorial waters led foreign 
fishing ships to plunder Somali’s fish stocks 
(Husein, 2010). The UN has estimated that the 
cost of illegal fishing in Somalia reached $300 
million each year (Tharoor, 2009). The Somali 
fishing industry has always been a small-scale 
industry, which in terms of their fleet, lacked 
new technologies and modern boats compared 
to foreign fleets (Tharoor, 2009). With their 
own rudimentary equipment, local fishermen 
could barely compete against the bigger and 
more modern foreign ships. In addition to 
illegal fishing, Somali waters have become the 
dumping ground for industrialized countries 
of hazardous waste since the early 1980s.
 The 2005 UNEP environmental assessment 
on Somalia reported that the waste dumped 
along Somalia’s coasts comprises of highly 
toxic waste dangerous to the environment 
and the health of local populations (Tharoor, 
2009). Most of this waste was not disposed of 
adequately according to international measures. 
The 2004 tsunami led to the contamination of 
the drinkable water sources for the population 
(UNEP, 2005). To this day, the dumping of 
hazardous waste has had devastating impacts 
on the local populations, who have experienced 
health problems such as respiratory infections, 
skin diseases, child disfigurement, and even 
death (UNEP, 2005). It is estimated that the 
cost of dumping toxic or radioactive waste off 
the Horn of Africa for European companies is 
around $2.50 per ton instead of $250 per ton if 
these companies disposed of the waste properly 
and legally in Europe (Tharoor, 2009). 
As a response to the environmental and 
illegal fishing threats, Somali fishermen were 
forced to defend their waters and insure their 
fishing expeditions (Tharoor, 2009). In the early 
90s, the fishermen took up arms against foreign 
ships. At the beginning of maritime piracy, 
trawlers intercepted boats without licenses 
and paid a small amount to the interceptors to 
conceal the illegality of their activity. People 
saw in this practice the possibility to make 
money. Soon, fishermen joined hands with 
militias and unemployed youth to hijack 
ships (Raunek, 2016). Pirates were able to 
create a business centered on ship hijacking 
and ransoming, which consequently led their 
interest to bigger catches with higher value 
(Tharoor, 2009). Although the initial motive 
of these fishermen was the protection of their 
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waters, the economic gains from intercepting 
foreign ships rapidly took over.  
Piracy, An Economic Phenomenon
Somalia’s economic situation helped 
foster the development of piracy. As a result 
of the civil unrest, the Somali economy was 
completely destroyed. The absence of a central 
government to regulate and articulate coherent 
economic policies aggravated the country’s 
economy. Poverty in Somalia is endemic. 
Over 12 million people are living below the 
international poverty line, at $0.19/day in 
2017 (World Bank, 2017). The unemployment 
rate is one of the highest, accounting for 67% 
of a young population in which 70% of the 
population is under the age of 30 (UNICEF, 
2017). Inequality is high as economic growth 
happens in the city, accentuating the gap 
between urban and rural areas (World Bank, 
2017). The absence of a stable government 
providing services to the population means 
that the private sector has become the main 
provider of these services. This privatization 
has led to the development of an unregulated 
economy in which piracy and other criminal 
activities are booming freely (Menkhaus, 
2010). 
Piracy became a particularly lucrative 
business that generated $415 million in ransom 
money between 2009 and 2010 (Bowden et al., 
2010). So as long as Somalia’s economy does 
not improve, piracy will continue to thrive. In a 
country where poverty is rampant, piracy offers 
an alternative way to make a living, which 
attracts young Somali men. Piracy is viewed as 
an economic opportunity to improve people’s 
livelihoods. Pirates able to strike a good ransom 
deal can radically change their lives. This 
practice offers young men the opportunity 
to integrate the economic elite of the country 
(Osei-Tutu, 2011). Many build lavish houses, 
buy new cars, drugs, prostitutes, guns, and 
marry the most beautiful girls, thus giving them 
a taste of the high life (Hunter, 2008). 
Maritime piracy is able to grow on the 
gap left by the central state. It has revitalized 
local economies. Somali culture highlights the 
importance of sharing. Those who are wealthy 
are expected to share their resources with other 
members of the clan as a moral obligation 
(Shortland, 2012). The profits of piracy are 
distributed among the community. Roughly 
30% goes to the hijackers, 10% to the local 
community elders and officials, while 20% of 
profits go to financiers and the last 10% to the 
sponsors (Kellerman, 2011). 
On the other hand, piracy has brought 
significant development and infrastructure to 
the county and its population. For example, 
the inland city of Garowe has registered 
a wide growth from 2002 to 2009, with 
satellite images showing light industrial and 
commercial development (Shortland, 2012). 
A number of hotels have popped up, destined 
for a rich clientele most likely linked to pirates. 
Therefore, money earned through piracy has 
brought some contributions to the fast growth 
of Garowe, designating the city as the center 
for the pirates’ operations (Shortland, 2012). 
Piracy money is mostly spent inside Somalia, 
especially in the urbanized inland cities like 
Garowe.
Corruption of Somali Officials
The spread of piracy along the coast of 
Somalia, as well as the creation of strong base 
camps in urban cities, would not be possible 
without the high levels of corruption usually 
affecting failed states. Corruption is one of 
the elements undermining the formation of a 
stable authority in Somalia (Anti-Corruption 
Resource Centre U4, 2012). The country is 
ranked as one of the world’s most corrupt 
countries, obtaining in 2011 a score of 1 on a 
scale of 0 to 10, 10 being the highest level of 
cleanliness (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
U4, 2012). 
Corruption prevents economic growth 
and development (Ahmad, Ullah, & Arfeen, 
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2012). In Somalia, corruption is even more 
exacerbated by the elite who compete for 
power and access to resources (Ahmad, Ullah, 
& Arfeen, 2012). In a poverty-stricken system, 
corruption provides the perspective to increase 
the income, providing people with additional 
revenue which is not negligible in Somalia 
(Leslie, 2014).  
Corruption enables pirates to pursue their 
multimillion-dollar business with impunity. 
The absence of an effective government 
with sufficient resources to pay security 
forces gave strong incentives for bribery and 
extortion (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 
2012). For example, armed militias imposed 
fees and staff taxes to UN agencies and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) to 
access, monitor, and manage these agencies’ 
activities with the aim to divert humanitarian 
assistance (Member of the Monitoring Group 
on Somali and Eritrea, 2012). Immigration 
services, airports, customs, and ports are also 
affected. A large part of official corruption is 
conducted at the Mogadishu port and other 
ports in the Puntland area, where local officials 
are accepting bribes from pirates (Tharoor, 
2009). The telecommunication sector has been 
particularly affected by corruption due to its 
importance for piracy. Telecommunication 
companies often pay undeclared fees to officials 
to protect them (Anti-Corruption Resource 
Centre, 2012). In areas where piracy is virulent, 
like Haboyo, hijacked ships are kept several 
miles from the coast. Telecommunication 
service is needed to ensure that the ships 
are guarded, supplied, and that the hostages 
are alive. Pirates use the Internet to evaluate 
ransoms (Shortland, 2012). Furthermore, 
pirates need to access information, especially 
from government and port officials, in order to 
conduct their operations (Gilpin, 2009). Bribing 
officials guarantee the continuous access of ship 
information (Gilpin, 2009).  
Corruption is intrinsically linked to 
money laundering (OECD, 2017). Organized 
pirate syndicates operating in Dubai have been 
laundering money acquired through ransoms. 
People incriminated in these illicit operations 
include businessmen from Somalia and the 
Middle-East mainly. These syndicates play a 
major role in the development of piracy off 
the Somali coast, especially by getting access 
to new technologies useful for hijacking and 
tracking ships (Sengupta & Howden, 2009). 
Piracy, A Response to Somalia’s Social 
Context
The economic degradation that followed 
the disintegration of the Somali state severely 
impacted the population, allowing piracy to 
thrive in such an environment. The two decades 
of civil unrest led to severe social consequences, 
such as widespread poverty, hunger, and the 
displacement of the population. The collapse 
of the state gave rise to conflicts between clans 
and factions for control over territories and 
resources essential for survival (Bradbury 
& Healy, 2010). The scarcity of resources 
only fueled more violence. Consequently, it 
forced 1.5 million people to flee Somalia from 
December 1991 to March 1992 and it displaced 
over 2 million people (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).
Furthermore, the Horn of Africa is 
particularly vulnerable to food shortages. Food 
security is measured by the availability, access, 
stability, and the utilization of food (Stringer, 
2016, pp.11-18). In Somalia, food shortages were 
accentuated by the ongoing conflict, making it 
difficult for humanitarian operations to take 
place. It also hindered agricultural production. 
This led to a substantial increase in the price 
of food for people who could barely afford 
enough to sustain their existence (Terefe, 2012). 
The combination of these several social 
and economic issues has contributed to the 
implementation of piracy. When taking into 
consideration that a single pirate hijack can lead 
to a ransom anywhere between $500,000 and 
$3 million (with individual profit going up to 
$15,000 in a country where poverty is rampant 
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and economic opportunities are low) it becomes 
understandable why piracy has been such an 
attractive business for young Somalis (Gilpin, 
2009). This practice guarantees their survival 
in face of misery. 
In order to defeat piracy, it is important 
to address the issues Somalia faces as a failed 
state. As Murphy said, piracy is foremost a 
land-based crime as it arises from economic 
and social problems. The root of these problems 
resides in the non-existence of a functional 
state that can perform its duties and provide 
opportunities and security for its inhabitants. 
Addressing Piracy Offshore
The Holes in the Application of the Legal 
Framework on Piracy
The United Nations Convention on the 
law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the main basis 
upon which the legal framework FOR piracy is 
set. UNCLOS reflects customary international 
law which binds all states, parties, and non-
parties (Marciniak, 2012). Piracy is defined in 
article 101 of UNCLOS as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, 
or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers 
of a private ship or a private aircraft, 
and directed: (i) on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or 
property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 
or aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b).
This definition presents certain limitations. 
The conditions for an act to qualify as piracy 
are acts committed for private ends, involving 
at least two ships and taking place on the 
high seas (Chalk, Smallman, & Burger, 2009).
This definition excludes many acts of piracy 
occurring on territorial seas. Furthermore, the 
definition stresses on an act committed for 
private ends meaning that an act motivated by 
political ends does not qualify as piracy under 
UNCLOS (Kao, 2016).
In the case of piracy in Somalia, the main 
issue regards article 100 of UNCLOS which 
states: 
“All States shall cooperate to 
the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas 
or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.”
Piracy is a crime that falls under 
international jurisdiction. Every state has the 
responsibility to arrest any person participating 
in piracy. UNCLOS provides a legal basis to 
prosecute these acts; however, this framework 
depends on whether nations have sufficient 
national laws and willingness to bring pirates 
to trial (Chalk, Smallman, & Burger, 2009). The 
problem in the Horn of Africa is that captured 
pirates were often released without facing 
justice. Somali pirates are unlikely to be tried 
in Somalia due to the absence of an effective 
government (Warner, 2013). The seizing states 
are usually reluctant to use such extensive 
powers by prosecuting and bringing arrested 
pirates to their courts, as this represents a 
considerable burden to the seizing state. If 
Somali pirates were to serve their sentence in 
another country, their return to Somalia would 
be impossible. Moreover, the length of the 
detention before being charged or receiving 
legal assistance are possibly violating human 
rights laws (Treves, 2009; Warner, 2013; BBC, 
2011). This demonstrates the clear hole on how 
to deal with captured pirates (Treves, 2009). As 
a result, effective international actions were 
slowed down off the coasts of Somalia, which 
led pirates to be released without facing any 
criminal charges (Treves, 2009).
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International Cooperation as A Solution 
Against Piracy 
Effectively defeating piracy in Somalia 
demanded extensive international cooperation 
and self-investment from different navies, 
which today represents a remarkable degree 
of collaboration between countries (Chalk, 
Smallmaen, & Burger, 2009). The international 
community agreed to adopt a common and 
global approach regarding piracy in order to 
secure the region. Several joint actions were set 
up. States use naval power to counter the threat. 
In 2008, the European Union (EU) 
launched a counter-piracy operation named 
EU NAVFOR- Atalanta along the coasts of 
Somalia (European Union Naval Force Somalia, 
2015). The different countries taking part in 
this operation provide navy vessels, maritime 
patrols, and reconnaissance aircraft, as well 
as military and civilian staff (European Union 
Naval Force Somalia, 2015).
This operation enables EU NAVFOR to 
arrest suspected pirates and seize all objects 
onboard suspected ships. People apprehended 
during the operation can be prosecuted by 
any EU members, and by neighboring nations 
where the pirates are caught, or a third-party 
State (European Union Naval Force Somalia, 
2015). A transfer option is given for states who 
seized pirates and who do not want to exercise 
their jurisdiction. Pirates can be transferred to 
any member-state or third-party state willing 
to prosecute them (Treves, 2009). Moreover, the 
operation does not only aim at tracking down 
and bringing pirates to trial, but it also aims at 
destroying the business of piracy especially its 
financing. The EU’s action works on sharing 
information with Interpol and EUROPOL 
(European Union Naval Force Somalia, 2008). 
Since 2008, Operation Atalanta has been 
highly successful. It has effectively helped 
drop the number of pirate attacks before they 
happen. To illustrate this last point, in January 
2011, 736 people were taken hostage and 32 
ships were captured by pirates. By October 
2016, no persons nor ships were detained by 
pirates, showing that Operation Atalanta has 
contributed to the prevention and deterrence of 
acts of piracy in Somalia by notably providing 
protection to ships in the “High Risk Area”, 
which is an area where there is a higher 
risk for piracy to happen and in which self-
protective measures are most likely required 
(International Maritime Organization).
Furthermore,  Operation Atalanta 
has worked closely with several regional 
governments, such as Kenya, the Seychelles 
and Mauritius, for the transfer of presumed 
pirates with the perspective of their persecution 
and conviction, thus illustrating the EU’s 
determination to defeat piracy by applying 
sanctions in collaboration with other 
governments thus strengthening the legal 
framework in place and patrolling the Gulf 
of Aden and the Indian Ocean as well as 
conducting reconnaissance and surveillance 
missions (European Union Naval Force 
Somalia, 2015).
The EU’s engagement against piracy has 
also led EU NAVFOR to conduct land raids in 
Somalia after Operation Atalanta was expanded 
to include land targets. With the support of the 
Somali transitional government, the first raid 
was led near the port of Haradhere, a well-
known pirate base. The goal was to destroy 
onshore safe havens for pirates and deprive 
them of logistics to pursue their operations 
(BBC, 2012).  
Just like the EU NAVFOR and its Operation 
Atalanta, other joint measures have been 
instituted like the CTF-151, a multinational task 
force established to coordinate international 
maritime patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Several 
states like China, Russia, and South Korea have 
been sending navy ships into the region (Chalk, 
Smallman, & Burger, 2009). These measures 
were given more weight thanks to Resolutions 
1816, 1846, and 1851 passed by the Security 
Council which urge states to take necessary 
actions to stop pirate attacks coming from 
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Somali territorial waters (Chalk, Smallman, & 
Burger, 2009). 
Resolution 1851, adopted in December 
2008, encouraged nations and regional 
organizations fighting against piracy to put 
in place: “[…] an international cooperation 
mechanism to as  a common point of contact 
between and among states, regional and 
international organizations on all aspects of 
combating piracy […] off Somalia’s coast,” 
(United Nations Security Council, Resolution 
185, 2008, p.3).  
The following year, the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was 
established. The CGPCS serves as the coordinator 
between the different navies involved in counter-
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Internationally 
Recognized Transit Corridor and the Somali 
basin. Through concrete steps, the group works 
actively on mitigating piracy threats by giving 
counter-piracy trainings, promoting the Best 
Management Practices (BMP) (which are counter-
piracy measures for ships), and also promoting 
ways to strengthen self-protection capabilities 
(Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.)
Compared to the EU NAVFOR, the 
CGPCS holds the role of spreading public and 
diplomatic information on several aspects of 
piracy, thus raising awareness on the threat 
posed by this issue (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). 
Furthermore, in 2009, the CGPCS launched a 
mission in East Africa and in the Gulf of Aden 
which aimed to assess the regional capabilities 
of counter-piracy. The final report highlighted 
the need to bring support to solutions against 
piracy, which include strengthened penal and 
judicial legislations and involving the media 
and the communities in the fight against 
piracy (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). More 
importantly, the report highly recommends the 
further implementation of the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct upon which counter-piracy measures 
depend (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.).
Naval actions alone will not solve the 
issue of piracy in Somalia; it can only deter its 
operations. As such, a global and comprehensive 
approach by nations needs to be adopted and 
the legal framework against piracy needs to 
be strengthened to reaffirm the international 
community’s will to end piracy. 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct
As emphasized by the CGPCS, the key 
to defeating piracy lies on the development 
of a regional approach regarding the issue. 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct focuses on 
localized actions to counter piracy in the region 
as opposed to actions led on water by naval 
forces (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). This initiative, 
which is a legally non-binding instrument, 
reflects the international community’s will 
and determination to erase piracy. The next 
important step lies in capacity-building which 
includes the reinforcement and the consolidation 
of national institutions. The parties to the 
Djibouti Code are committed to sharing and 
reporting information to information centers as 
well as national focal points and prohibit ships 
suspected of piracy (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). 
Moreover, nations also engage in arresting and 
prosecuting pirates. The objective is to empower 
a state’s law enforcement forces as well as 
to enhance national legislations on piracy to 
meet the need of the state’s law enforcement 
and judiciary system (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 
n.d.).  The present Code of Conduct takes into 
consideration international cooperation in the 
scope of maritime security operations as well as 
the coordination of security operations through 
the three maritime information-sharing centers 
(Kraska & Wilson, 2009). By reinforcing regional 
capacities by notably developing the Somali 
and other East African countries coastguards 
and providing a regional training program with 
other international organizations, such as NATO 
and the EU, the Code aims at creating a first wall 
against piracy (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct is an 
important instrument supplementing the 
existing legal framework regarding piracy. 
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The objective is to make this framework more 
effective in combating piracy. For this reason, 
the Code of Conduct stresses parties, such 
as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to help provide 
resources for East African countries in order 
to develop the capabilities of the region. The 
main issue faced by many of these countries 
is the lack of resources (Muli, 2011). It has 
become apparent that a big disparity from a 
technological standpoint exists between East 
African countries that clearly lack maritime 
security capacity and big naval forces like 
the United States (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). It 
becomes difficult to work when such differences 
remain between the countries, because piracy 
is an international issue and the only way to 
defeat it is through multilateral cooperation 
and the development of countries like Somalia 
in terms of maritime capacity. The Jeddah 
Amendment adopted in 2017 revised the 
Djibouti Code by broadening its scope to 
include a range of illicit maritime activities such 
as human trafficking and illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing (IUU) (IMO, 2019). 
In particular, the amendment shifted the 
traditional state security perspective to human 
security by recognizing the importance of the 
“blue economy” in promoting sustainable 
economic growth, employment, and stability 
(Brits & Nel, 2018). Local economies would 
benefit from sustainable fishery management 
and prevention of maritime crimes.  The Jeddah 
Amendment is the first agreement to paint a 
bigger picture on maritime issues in the region 
(Menzel, 2018). Its success only depends on 
the willingness of countries to implement the 
new measures. The amendment is a small step 
towards progress. It offers a newly perspective 
on the issue; however, it is still very restrictive, 
focusing on national security rather than 
human security as a solution to maritime issues 
in the region (Brits & Nel, 2018)
Although the Djibouti Code offers a great 
advancement in the domain of counter-piracy 
and cooperation, the question of whether 
or not the Code can reach its objectives is 
debatable. It is primarily a non-binding 
agreement, which is apolitical and operating 
mostly on a technical level, showing that, in 
reality, the level of political support is quite 
weak (Bueger & Saran, 2012).  Moreover, there 
is no guarantee that countries in the region 
will successfully cooperate with each other, 
especially knowing the history of national 
rivalries and disputes in the region. Bueger & 
Saran (2012) The second flaw of the Djibouti 
Code lies in its over-ambitious agenda, which 
aims at creating a trans-regional solution by 
bringing together African and Gulf nations but 
excluding countries like India and Pakistan, 
which are two important maritime powers 
active in the domain of counter-piracy, due the 
operational field of piracy groups in the Indian 
Ocean (Bueger & Saran, 2012).
However, the implementation of the 
Djibouti Code is a big step forward in the fight 
against piracy. It is an important step in the 
development of regional capacities (Geiss & 
Petrig, 2011). It is through the development 
of a regional infrastructure that piracy can be 
addressed in the long term. The workshops 
and training offered, as well as the culture of 
information-sharing and communication, are 
the main keys the Djibouti Code highlights in 
order to advance a functional counter-piracy 
policy (Bueger & Saran, 2012). 
International Measures and its Impact on 
Piracy
The different measures taken since 2008 
have had a positive impact on the number 
of pirate attacks near the coasts of Somalia, 
showing a sharp decline. According to the 
International Maritime Bureau, they registered 
only 15 attacks off the coasts of Somalia in 
2013 compared to the 75 incidents in 2012 and 
237 incidents in 2011, which was the peak of 
Somali piracy (ICC, 2013). In 2016, no successful 
attacks off Somalia were registered (Patinkin, 
2017). More recently, a new report published 
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by the ICC International Maritime Bureau 
reveals a further decline of piracy attacks. 
From January to June 2017, 87 attacks have 
been reported compared with 97 incidents 
worldwide, showing a decline when compared 
to the same previous period, where 97 incidents 
were reported. Piracy off Somalia’s coasts made 
up only 5 of these incidents (ICC, July 2017).
This successful decrease in attacks have 
been attributed to the efforts of the international 
community, especially through naval operations, 
mitigation measures, and the determination of 
the international community to defeat the threat 
posed by piracy in Somalia. Although the number 
of incidents has been low since 2012, the region 
is not completely free of pirates, and continued 
efforts will need to be made to assure that the 
Gulf of Aden remains safe. 
Addressing Piracy Onshore
The main key to addressing the issue of 
piracy in Somalia is to create a peaceful and 
stable environment to enable the process of 
peace-building and state-building. The Somali 
Compact is the result of a process determining 
Somalia’s priorities for three years (2014-2016). 
This compact has included a comprehensive 
approach to the main peace and state-building 
goals, which include rebuilding trust and 
dialogue among Somalis. However, progress 
is still to be made regarding engagement and 
dialogue with Somalis as well as the coherence 
between humanitarian and development efforts 
in order to produce long-term results (Manuel 
et al., 2017).  Along with state-building efforts, 
there is a clear need to establish the legitimacy 
of the government in order to restore stability 
in the country (Hearn et al., 2014). Thus, there is 
the need to involve and actively engage Somali 
people. The challenge is to create a unified voice 
and promote cooperation in order to create 
democratic political institutions and engage 
in peace mediation and capacity-building in 
health and education sectors (Tiilikainen & 
Muhamed, 2012).
As  one  of  the  main components 
of the Somali Compact, stability calls for 
initiatives such as the Transition Initiatives 
for Stabilization+ (TIS +) to increase stability 
and further the participatory process in order 
to promote good governance and community 
cohesion at district and communal levels. 
These initiatives advocate for the restoration 
of dialogue between communities through 
art, culture, and sports activities to enable 
the population to heal from the trauma of the 
war and prevent vulnerable classes to fall into 
extremism (USAID, 2019). 
Stability also goes along with economic 
initiatives to assure the long-term re-
establishment of the Somali Government. The 
lack of economic recovery and employment 
opportunities reinforce the cycle of violence 
and conflicts that have driven many Somalis 
to engage in piracy as an alternative for living 
(Menkhaus, 2004). State failure results in the 
collapse of the economy and economic collapse 
creates state failure. The goal is to break this 
vicious cycle (Menkhaus, 2004). Creating 
economic opportunities will ultimately 
improve the livelihood of the population by 
creating jobs and increasing production and 
income. Economic programs like the Growth, 
Enterprise, Employment and Livelihood 
program (GEEL) aim to integrate Somalia into 
the global economy, thus reviving the local 
economies (USAID, 2019). Change is caused 
by the evolution of political and economic 
interests of key actors in Somalia. For example, 
UNOSOM has had an important economic 
presence in Somalia, which has produced 
economic opportunities such as procurement 
and construction contracts, property rentals, 
and currency exchange. Economic actors were 
motivated by the potential economic gains that 
led to a shift to more legitimate commerce and 
services (Menkhaus, 2004). 
The revitalization of the economy will 
demand human capital. Education will be 
essential to support economic growth. The 
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to reinforce and strengthen the authority of the 
present institutions to reestablish the rule of 
law. Somalia’s transitional government needs 
to actively fight corruption, which enabled 
piracy to spread with impunity throughout 
the country as well as work actively to break 
down the underground economy created by 
this business with the help of the international 
community, since piracy is a transnational 
threat. 
The case presented the importance of 
an effective and strengthened justice system 
willing to eradicate this problem. Even though 
piracy is a crime that falls under universal 
jurisdiction, the reality shows that states are 
often unwilling to assume such extended rights 
or are unable to prosecute suspected pirates 
due to inadequate national legislation or the 
lack of law enforcement, as was the case with 
Somalia. From the beginning, the international 
regime against piracy lacked efficiency in 
dealing with captured pirates, which led to 
the unwillingness of nations to bring charges 
against pirates. This lack of efficiency hindered 
effective international actions to take place.
The trigger, which led to the change of 
the international community’s attitude, was 
the surge of Somali pirate attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden from 2008 to 2012. The global approaches 
adopted by the international community 
showed its determination to eradicate piracy 
in Somali waters. This approach pushed for 
multilateral cooperation between nations. 
Operations led by EU NAVFOR, CT-151, and 
the establishment of the CGPCS are signs that 
the international community will no longer 
tolerate acts of piracy. Naval operations, like 
Atalanta, send a clear message to pirates that 
the stance on piracy has changed. It is a clear 
example of a determined policing effort. The 
international community is taking a hard line in 
the repression of this crime. Since cooperation 
means that information-sharing is necessary in 
order to dismantle the business model of piracy 
and track down the people behind it, honest 
Somali population is particularly young, 
around 40% of Somalis are between the 
age of 6-18; this demographic will become 
important contributors to the economy in the 
years to come. Education will enable younger 
generations to learn skills and knowledge. 
The challenge is to overcome low school 
enrollment and the lack of educational facilities 
and qualified teachers in the country that have 
suffered due to civil wars (World Bank Group, 
2019).
Conclusion 
The case of piracy in Somalia has illustrated 
the importance of defeating piracy by resolving 
Somalia’s internal problems and strengthening 
its criminal justice system. Piracy developed 
as a consequence of the disintegration of the 
Somali state. The population was severely 
affected by the two decades of conflict that 
followed the collapse of the Barre regime in 
1991. Violence became an integral part of life 
for the Somali people. With no functioning 
government able to perform state duties, such 
as assuring security on land and sea, Somalia 
became the victim of plundering from foreign 
ships and the dumping ground of toxic waste, 
which ultimately triggered fisherman to take 
up arms and engage in acts of piracy as a way 
of survival due to the gross lack of economic 
opportunities and the vicious circle of poverty 
and hunger that kept creeping up. This setting 
enabled piracy to flourish and impose its roots 
deeply within Somali society.
Understanding the background history 
of Somalia is the main key to addressing the 
issue of piracy. Piracy takes its roots on land, 
which means that in order to defeat piracy it 
is important to work on a solution on land by 
confronting the economic and social issues 
present in Somalia and articulating long-term 
action plans to revitalize Somalia’s economy 
as well as assuring humanitarian aid to the 
country to fight poverty and famine and 
continue the process of state-building in order 
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communication between the different parties to 
the fight are required. Finally, as demonstrated 
by the Djibouti Code of Conduct, naval 
operations are not enough to stop pirates; it is 
important to develop the maritime capacities 
of countries like Somalia, in collaboration with 
other international organizations that should be 
on the front line in the fight against piracy. This 
case also illustrated the importance of social and 
economic initiatives in order to restore stability 
in the Somali society for the peace-building 
and state-building process to begin. These 
onshore initiatives are aimed at increasing the 
well-being of the society by providing durable 
and viable living alternatives for young Somali 
citizens. The approach of the international 
community has begun to shift to an approach 
based on human development instead of only 
focusing on military measures. 
The effectiveness of these different 
measures and initiatives has led to the decrease 
of pirate attacks in Somali waters between 
the 2011 peak of piracy and 2017. The efforts 
made to address the issue of piracy should be 
maintained and strengthened. The position 
of Somalia has revealed the importance of 
bringing the fight both on land and at sea. Piracy 
is more than just attacks against ships; it is the 
consequence of economic and social problems 
and the lack of an efficient government. The 
threat of piracy, although greatly reduced, is 
still present; the main task is to control it.  
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